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Abstract: This paper analyzes the secret reservation price in eBay auctions. Under the assumptions of 
secret and public reservation price, the bidders choose the optimal bidding function and the seller selects 
equilibrium reservation price. This model argues that the choice of secret reservation price is rational for 
the seller, as they can generate higher revenue in certain conditions. It predicts that, under endogenous 
entry, secret reservation price leads to higher revenue since it attracts more bidders to the auction. This 
effect is more noticeable for luxury goods. However, secret and public reservation prices generate 
identical revenue for the seller if entry is exogenous. Furthermore, the results are supported by numerous 
recent empirical works. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ever since the origin of internet auctions in 1995, web-based auctions have developed at a remarkable 
rate. One of the largest consumer-oriented auction sites is eBay, where individual sellers list their items 
for vending, and individual buyers bid on the items. Nowadays, eBay is one of the largest marketplaces in 
the world with an annual transactions over 60 billion dollars. Internet auctions represent a rich topic for 
research. One of the most interesting features of eBay’s auction mechanism is secret reservation price. 
Unlike the standard auction setting, in which the reservation price is announced to all the bidders before 
submitting their biddings, eBay has an option for sellers to keep reservation price hidden. The 
reservation price is not disclosed to the bidders, but kept as secret in the auction. The reservation price is 
disclosed only after all the bidders submit their bidding. This type of mechanism is simply referred as 
secret reservation price.  
 
Since secret reservation price is ubiquitous in eBay, the study of it has a realistic significance to both 
market agents and researchers. To the agents, it is still left unexplained how the bidders should bid and 
how the sellers should choose the optimal level of reservation price. More importantly, because secret 
and public reservation price divide payoffs to the sellers and bidders unevenly, the study of secret 
reservation price is also crucial to the mechanism designer. The central planner is capable to decide 
which reservation price, hidden or public, maximize the social welfare. To the researchers, the study of 
secret reservation explains the rationality behind this common practice: why sellers choose to keep 
reservation price hidden, and when should they do so?  
 
The importance of secret reservation price attracted the attention of researchers for years. Elyakime, 
Laffont, Loisel, and Vuong (1994) provide a fundamental theoretical framework on this issue.  However, 
their model fails to justify the common practice of secret reservation price: their model predicts that, for 
the sellers, a public reservation price is superior to the secret reservation price. A possible reason of this 
dilemma is that they only consider the case of first price, private-value auctions with risk-neutral bidders.  
Many subsequent scholars, attempting to rationalize the secret reservation price, modified the original 
assumptions in Elyakime et al.(1994). They found some support for this widely observed practice. 
Vincent (1995) deviates from the assumption of private-value auctions and extends the model to 
common-value auctions. He demonstrated an example in which secret reservation price can increase ex 
ante expected profit for the seller in common value auctions. Li and Tan (2000) provide an alternative 
insight in this subject. In their research, they adopt the assumption of risk-averse bidder. They concluded 
that, as the number of the risk-averse buyer increases, the hidden reserve price is likely to dominate in a 
private value auction.  
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One major drawback of existing literatures is that most of them failed to provide reasonable explanations 
for secret reservation price in private-value second-price actions such as eBay auction. Elyakime et. al 
(1994) find no advantage of secret reservation price at all, whereas, and Li and Tan(2000) only address 
the puzzle in the setting of common-value or first-price auctions. This paper resolves these problems by 
introducing endogenous entry assumption into the model.   The main results of this research show that 
the choice of secret reservation price is rational for the seller, as they can generate higher revenue in 
certain conditions. Under endogenous entry, secret reservation price attracts more bidders to the auction 
and thus lead to higher revenue, especially for luxury items. The remaining parts are organized as follows. 
Section 2 will scrutinize the institutional details of eBay auctions. Section 3 examines the eBay auction 
mechanism; four discusses the possible effect of endogenous entry. In section 5, I provide a brief 
discussion of the empirical results and some of my theoretical predictions. The conclusion is in section 6. 
 
Institutional Details of eBay Auctions: eBay provides a central market for consumers and sellers to 
trade using auctions. Sellers pay a fee whereas bidders pay no fee, and sellers also choose an auction type 
for the sale of their goods. They set a starting bid, a minimum bid increment and specify the duration of 
the auction. They also have the option to set a secret reserve price.  If they do, during the auction process 
eBay indicates whether the reserve price has been met or not, and if the reserve price has not been met at 
the end of the auction, sellers have the option of not selling the item. (Hinz and Spann, 2008) 
 
It is generally agreed that the mechanism used by eBay resembles a second-price auction. At any time, 
eBay shows the current standing bid of the auction, which is the current second highest bid, and the 
transaction price is the second highest bidding; in the special cases where there is no bid or only one bid, 
the current standing bid is the starting bid.  When a bidder submits a bid, he/she knows the current 
standing bid, the identity of the seller, the starting and ending time of the auction and a description of the 
item. However, the exact amount of each bid is not revealed until the end of the auction.  The final price is 
the second highest bid plus a specified minimum increment. (Katkar and Reiley, 2007; Levin and Smith, 
1996) 
 
eBay Auctions with Exogenous Entry: As argued before, second price private value auction typically 
depicts the secret reservation price mechanism used in eBay. To capture these features, Section 3.1 
models second price auctions with a hidden reservation price. After deriving the equilibrium condition of 
the model, the following section compares the revenue generated under secret and public reservation 
price.  
 
The Model: First, specify the mechanism of the second price auction with a hidden reservation price. 
There is one risk neutral seller tries to sell a single object to n bidders in an auction. The valuation of each 
bidder is v1, v2, v3 … vn, which are private information for the bidder i. Further, assume they are 
independently draw from [0,1] with a PDF of f(·) and CDF of F(·); the seller’s valuation is v0, which is also 
draw from [0,1] but with a possible different PDF of g(·) and CDF if G(·); The buyers are assumed to be 
risk adverse, and their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is u(·). Again, f(·) and g(·) are 
continuously differentiable; and u(·) is strictly increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable. The 
timing of the game is described as follows: in the period zero, natural assigns a private valuation of vi to 
each bidder and t to the seller. In the first period, bidders submit their biddings b1,b2,…bn and the seller 
write down the reservation price r in sealed envelopes; in the second period, all biddings are open and 
reservation price is revealed. The object is given to the bidder with highest bidding if it is higher than the 
reservation price. The winner pays the higher price between the second highest bidder and the 
reservation price.  
 
Before formally examine the bidding functions, an interesting institutional feature of the model is notable. 
“Since the seller tenders a sealed bid, which is opened at the same time as the buyers' sealed bids, the 
seller is not much different from a buyer except that his objective function and eventually the distribution 
of his valuation are different.” (Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel, and Vuong ,1994). Formally, consider two types 
of auctions: the second price, private value auction with a secret reservation price r satisfying all the 
above assumptions, denoted by (G1); and another no reservation price, second price auction with the 
same bidders as(G1) and an additional bidder bn+1 = r (her bidding is r), denoted by (G2). After seeing (G1) 
and (G2) generate the equivalent payoff for the bidders, their strategy can be characterized by 
proposition 1. 
 
328 
 
Proposition 1 In the second price, private value auctions with secret reservation price, the weakly 
dominate bidding strategy for the bidders is to bid his/her true valuation. Proof:  Without loss of 
generality, consider the bidder i. If her bidding bi is the highest among all biddings 
( ji bb , niij ,...1,1,...2,1 ), and larger than r ( rbi ), then in (G1), she is the winner and pays 
max{b1, b2, ...bi-1, bi+1…bn, r}.  Equivalently, in (G2), bidder i is also the winner, and pays the second highest 
amount among {b1, b2, …bn, r}. It is straightforward to see that the bidder i make the same amount of 
payment in both (G1) and (G2) if she wins. On the other hand, if she loses the auction, nothing is paid in 
both cases, obviously. This argument leads to the conclusion that for any bidder 1,2,…n, (G1) and (G2) 
gives the same results. To the bidders, the mechanism (G1) is identical to the case in which seller joins the 
auction as an additional bidder, so the strategy of bidders will also be the same. As a result, the strategy 
for the bidders is given as 
 
nivvb ii ,...2,1,)(  
 
Comparison of Revenue: Without solving the problem for the sellers, proposition 1 predicts that, in the 
second price auction, secret reservation price provides the same revenue as announced reservation price. 
Because bidders’ strategy is the same in both cases, the seller’s revenue should also be identical. 
Proposition 2   In the second price, private value auctions, secret reservation price and public reservation 
generates identical revenue for the seller. 
Proof: Followed from proposition 1 directly 
 
Given all bidders reveal her true valuations, the seller’s payoff V(r, v0) is 
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The first part of (3) captures the payoff when reservation price r is less than the second highest bidding. 
In this case, the payment received from bidders is the second highest bidding. The second part of (2) 
calculates the payoff when reservation price r is larger than the second highest bidding but still less than 
the highest price bidding. In this case, the payment received from bidders is just r. Maximizing (11) with 
respect to r derives the optimal secret reservation price. Then, solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
for this game. 
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To sum up, in an eBay auction with secret reservation price, the bidders submit the bidding equal to their 
private valuation, but the seller does not always set secret reservation price equivalent to her private 
valuation. Most importantly, with exogenous entry, both public and secret reservation price provide the 
same revenue for the seller, no matter how risk-averse the bidders are. 
 
eBay Auctions with Endogenous Entry: The standard independent valuation auction assumes the 
number of bidders is public information, and it is determined outside the model.  Obvious, this is not a 
realistic assumption. The seller may know the number of potential bidders. However, since participation 
incurs some cost, e.g. transaction cost, opportunity cost and so on, whether to participate in the auction is 
an important decision for the bidders. The bidder may not want to participate because the cost can 
overweight the expected payoff in the auction. Empirically, Bajari (2003) find that in eBay, the number of 
bidders is related to the time of bids, seller’s reputation, and the existence of secret reservation price. He 
concludes that the participation of the bidders is endogenous. In this section, the motivation is trying to 
relax the assumption of exogenous number of bidders and to see whether the earlier analysis is robust to 
the assumption of endogenous entry. The first consider the participation decision for the bidders, and 
then compare the seller’s revenue generated by the public reservation price with secret ones. 
 
As Menezes and Monteiro(2000) it is assumed that the number of potential bidder to be n, and bidders 
face participation costs c )1,0( .1 This cost can be any transaction cost, opportunity cost and so on. The 
                                                             
1  Dr. Kunimoto raises an interesting concern on this assumption. It is true that every bidder may have different opportunity cost to 
participate in the auction. However, it is better to think c here as a fixed cost, and all variable cost are included in the term vi i.e. 
(1) 
 
(2) 
(3) 
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timing of the game with a secret reservation price is as follows: In the period zero, natural assigns a 
private valuation of vi to each bidder and v0 to the seller. In the first period, potential bidders decide 
whether to enter the auction given her own valuation vi. If entered, the actual bidders submit their 
biddings b1,b2,…bI and the seller write down the reservation price r in sealed envelopes. If not enter, 
bidders receive zero. The remaining part game is the same as the standard second price sealed-bid 
auctions. The timing of a public reservation is similar to the secret reservation price case. Rather than 
with a reservation price r in sealed envelope, the seller announce the r publicly before bidder decide 
whether to join the auction. 
 
Lemma 1: Either for any bidder chooses to participate in the second price sealed-bid auction, in one with 
secret reservation price or announced reservation price, biding his/her true private valuation is the 
weakly dominate strategy. Proof:  For any bidders enter the auction with secret reservation price, 
Proposition 1 applies. For any bidders enter the auction with public reservation price, standard proof of 
second price auction applies.2 In either of these two situations, bidding truthfully is the weakly dominate 
strategy. 
 
Lemma 1 describes the bidding strategy for the bidders after entering the auction. The next problem is to 
determine the participation condition for the bidders. Denote v as the cut-off value, namely, only 
bidders with a private valuation greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid in these auctions. 3 To 
simplify the analysis, assume uniform distribution of private valuation vi  on [0,1].  
In the case of public reservation price, suppose the public reservation price is given as r. if participate, the 
potential bidder with a private valuation vi  receives  
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The first term –c is the participation cost. The second term calculates the expected payoff when there is 
only one bidder taking part in the auction. In this case, the only bidder receives the item for free. The last 
term is the expected payoff when there is more than one bidder in the auction. 
Similarly, in the case of secret reservation price, suppose the secret reservation price is given as r = b(v0). 
The potential bidder with a private valuation vi  receives 
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Obviously, in the hidden reservation price case, there is one more integral compared to the public case. 
The difference between secret and public reservation price is that, in the case of announced reservation 
price, r is known; but in the secret case, it is not. So the bidders have to make an estimation of the 
reservation price when it is hidden.   
The participation condition requires that 0)()( vv Si
A
i
. Thus, in the public reservation price case, the 
participation condition is 
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In the case of hidden reservation price, the participation condition is 
cdv
vb
vbv
v n
S
S
0
1
0
1
0
0
)
)(1
)(
(
 
(21) indicates that for each r, there will be an associated cut-off value )(rv . This is due to the fact that 
bidders observe the reservation price r before deciding whether to participate. Thus, their strategies 
depend on what they observed. However, (22) shows that, in the case of secret reservation price, there 
will be only one cut-off value v  for any v0. This is because the bidders have no information about what 
the reservation price truly is. Obviously, (21) and (22) show that the participation condition is disparate 
for public and hidden reservation price. Consequently, proposition 2 is invalid under the assumption of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
bidder’s private valuation for the item. One the other hand, if c here is the entry fee into the auction, then our model is so simple that 
it does not consider seller can choose the optimal c.  
2 One proof is given in Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2002. 
3  See Menezes and Monteiro(2000) for proof and more details. Special Thanks to Prof. Maxim Sinitsyn (McGill University)  for 
precious comments on this assumption 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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endogenous entry, since the number of participated bidders can be different in these two cases. Please 
recall that the primary tasks in this section is to evaluate the number of participants under both hidden 
and public reservation price assumptions, and to investigate the reasons why auctions with a high value 
item tend to choose secret reservation price. The lemma 2 below answers this question. 
 Lemma  2  There exist a 0 , such that for any 
0v
, SP vv  
Proof: The proof of proposition 3 has two steps. First step is to show as 10v , 1r . The second step 
involves showing 1
P
v as 1r .First, 10 rv . This is due to the fact that, if rv0 , the seller 
has a positive probability to sell the item but making negative revenue. This is definitely irrational for the 
seller. As a result, by squeeze theorem, as 10v , 1r .Second, because c
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Since a highly valued item requires a high reservation price, making it public will deter many potential 
bidders from bidding. On the other hand, by keeping it secret, the sellers will avoid this trouble. Thus, 
secret reservation price auctions attract more participants than the auctions with a public reservation 
price. In other words, lemma 3 means that if the item in the auction is highly valued, then the secret 
reservation price attracts more participants than public reservation price.  After solving the cut-off value, 
it is possible to compare the expected revenue for the sellers under both mechanisms. Proposition 3 
summaries the findings as below.  
 
Proposition  3   Let 
PS , be the seller’s revenue in the secret reservation price auction and pubic 
reservation price respectively.  Assuming uniform distribution of private valuation vi  on [0,1], then given 
others equal, there exist a 0 , such that for any 0v , 
PS
 
Proof: First, it is easy to see from (13) that as the number of participant n increase, seller’s revenue raises. 
Therefore, from lemma 3, it follows that given others equal, there exist a 0 , such that for any 0v ,  
PS
 
To sum up, this section includes the assumption of endogenous entry into your model. If the value of the 
selling item is high, secret reservation price attracts a larger number of participants. Thus, by keeping the 
reservation price secret, the seller can gain more revenue. Lastly, these predictions are congruent with 
the empirical evidence: in eBay auctions, the more valuable the item is, the more likely it is sold under 
secret reservation price. 4 
 
Empirical Evidences: Recent popularity of online auctions provides an unprecedented opportunity for 
empirical auction studies due to the fact that the institutional features of eBay auctions are analogous to 
the second price auction with a secret reservation price. (Katkar and Reiley, 2007; Lucking-Reiley et al., 
2007). One type of research focuses on testing the assumption of endogenous entry. Bajari(2003) 
examines this assumption in eBay coin auctions by implementing a regression analysis methodology. It 
shows that a low minimum bid and a high book value significantly increase the number of bidders 
entering into an auction. This is consistent with a model in which bidding is a costly activity where 
bidders enter an auction until expected profits are equal to the costs of participating. In short, 
Bajari(2003) provide an empirical foundation for the assumption of endogenous entry in  this research.  
 
Another type of study concentrates on the comparison of the sell’s revenue. Lucking-Reiley et al.(2006) 
examine the determinant of auction prices in eBay in precious coin auctions. They conclude that secret 
reservation price can increase the revenue of the seller by approximately 15%, while public reservation 
price merely increase seller’s revenue by 0.01%. These directly support the model predictions that the 
seller can gain significantly higher revenue by making reservation price secret. A secret reservation price 
                                                             
4  See next section for more details 
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conveys higher revenue for the seller than a public one for the reason that as the auction items are 
valuable, a high public reservation price will deter bidders from entry. To sum up, there are empirical 
evidences that support the assumption of endogenous entry. Moreover, this paper predicts similar results 
as those observed in real data. 
 
 
2. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the secret reservation price in eBay auctions. Under the assumptions of secret and 
public reservation price, the model describes the optimal bidding function for the bidders and the 
equilibrium reservation price.  For the seller, the choice of secret reservation price is rational as they can 
generate higher revenue in certain conditions. The main results are that secret and public reservation 
price generates identical revenue for the seller if entry is exogenous. Otherwise, secret reservation price 
attracts more bidders to the auction and thus lead to higher revenue. Furthermore, the results are 
supported by empirical works such as Elyakime et al.(1997), Bajari(2003) and Lucking-Reiley et 
al.(2007).  
 
The model predicts that secret reservation price generates higher revenue for the seller under certain 
conditions.  These predictions have a practical implication for various market participants. For example, 
sellers may directly benefit from the mechanism of hidden reservation prices. Market provider, such as 
eBay, may also profit from the mechanism by setting the optimal fee of making reservation price secret.  
In addition, the results can generalize to other auctions outside eBay. For example, the undisclosed 
reservation price is always precious information in corporate merger and acquisition during the 
bargaining process. However, there are still many other types of auctions to consider. For example, is 
secret reservation price profitable in common-value auctions? Are endogenous entry and risk-averse the 
only reasons for the profitability of secret reservation price? After all, it is only the first attempt to justify 
the use of secret reservation price. Further research is needed to address all of these questions. 
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